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Abstract
We propose a model where the size of the public sector and aggregate output are interre-
lated through the occupational choice of agents who differ in their skill level and degree of
public-mindedness. When the public sector attracts bureaucrats with low degree of public
service motivation, they will use their position to rent seek by employing an excessive num-
ber of unskilled workers. This leads to an equilibrium with relatively high unskilled wages,
which lowers profits and deters entrepreneurship. Conversely, an equilibrium with a lean
public sector and greater private economic activity arises when public service motivated
agents populate the state bureaucracy. These agents exert high effort and employ a limited
number of unskilled workers. Our model also shows that a bloated public sector with high
wages may be supported by the unskilled agents.
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1 Introduction
Low quality and oversized public sectors are often perceived as an inefficient use of budgetary
resources that, if redressed, could improve public service delivery or help reduce poverty. It is
no surprise then that two of the biggest institutional lenders to developing countries, The IMF
and the World Bank, have actively promoted the inclusion of governance and corruption issues
on the development agenda since the late 90s.1 The concern with public sector mismanagement
goes, however, deeper than just an issue of wasting budgetary resources: poor bureaucratic
quality appears to be so important because it may also largely distort the operation of markets.
Indeed, cross-country studies show that corruption and rent seeking in the public bureaucracies
can severely hurt private investment and are associated with lower income per head [Mauro
(1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), and Keefer and Knack (1997)].2
In this paper, we argue that an oversized and inefficient public sector might also affect the
economy’s performance in a different way, by misallocating human resources through its partic-
ipation in labour markets. In particular, we suggest that the quality of the public bureaucracy
determines the demand of unskilled workers by the public sector, which in turn affects the
equilibrium wage. When unskilled wages are inflated by excessive public sector demand, profits
will be reduced and the private sector will lose attractiveness to potential entrepreneurs.
We focus on one particular aspect regarding the quality of bureaucrats that has attracted
growing interest over the past few years: whether or not they exhibit the appropriate ethics or
motivation for their jobs.3 Commonplace in this literature is the presumption that monetary
payoffs are not the only type of reward that individuals pursue and the idea that pro-social
behaviour cannot be perfectly monitored by monetary incentives. In such a context, it proves
desirable that bureaucrats display a sense of mission and commitment towards the society they
must serve. Such a sense of social mission has long been explored by the public administration
literature, which refers to it as public service motivation, and a large number of survey-based
studies provide evidence of its relevance in explaining the efficiency of public offices.4
In Sections 3 and 4, we propose an occupational choice model with heterogeneous agents
and two different sectors: the public sector managed by bureaucrats and the private sector
managed by entrepreneurs. There are two dimensions of heterogeneity among individuals. The
first is the level of skills, which is assumed to be publicly observable (e.g. education). Only
1See for example, ”Good Governance: The IMF’s Role” (1998).
2This negative relationship is also highlighted by comparative studies that look at different regions in Italy
[Putnam (1993) and Alesina, Danninger and Rostagno (2001)].
3See Francois (2000), Murdock (2002), Besley and Ghatak (2005), Benabou and Tirole (2006), Prendergast
(2007), Macchiavello (2008), Delfgaauw and Dur (2008, 2010), Ghatak and Mueller (2011), Bond and Glode
(2011).
4See discussion in Francois (2000) and references therein (pp. 275 and 276).
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highly skilled individuals may become entrepreneurs or may be appointed state bureaucrats.
The second source of heterogeneity is the individuals’ intrinsic public service motivation, which
is assumed to be private information. The advantage of filling the state bureaucracy with public
service motivated agents is that they are less inclined to rent seek.
In our model, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs need unskilled workers to carry out their
productive activities, and must compete for the same pool of workers in the (competitive) labour
market. Entrepreneurial activities yield profits, which are a decreasing function of the labour
cost. Bureaucrats earn a salary fixed by the central administration. In addition, bureaucrats
enjoy (some) discretionary power over the public budget. As a result, they could find ways to
abuse this power in order to extract rents from the society.
An important issue in our model is then how rent seeking materialises in the economy. In
that regard, we argue that several among the main channels used by bureaucrats to generate and
extract rents require somehow oversizing public employment. For example, bureaucrats may
bloat the public sector with excessive workers so as to extract different kinds of perks from some
of them. Alternatively, overemployment may be the result of the creation of (unnecessary) jobs
as a mean to directly appropriate income from it or to channel transfers to certain desired groups
of people. Indirect sources of rents may also lead to an oversized public sector: for example,
overmanning may be the result of clientelistic practices by state bureaucrats, as public jobs are
somehow exchanged for political support (Robinson and Verdier, 2002).
Within this framework, we show that markets might coordinate activities in two different
types of equilibria, depending on who self-select into the state bureaucracy. First, there is an
equilibrium in which only public service motivated agents become bureaucrats. These agents
keep an efficient public sector, which employs the lowest possible number of workers, subject to
providing all public goods demanded by the economy. In turn, a lean public sector disciplines
wages in the labour market, sustaining high entrepreneurial profits, which attracts agents whose
main concern is their own income (profit-driven agents) into entrepreneurship. A different
equilibrium arises when profit-driven agents control high-rank positions in the public sector
and use their discretionary power to extract rents by overhiring public workers. The ensuing
bloated public sector inflates aggregate labour demand, pushing up the equilibrium wage. This
situation becomes also self-sustained because low profits deter skilled profit-driven agents from
entering the entrepreneurial sector.
Bureaucratic rent seeking is clearly inefficient in our model. A crucial question that arises
is then whether individuals may put in place an institutional setup that precludes such rent
seeking. At the end of Section 5 we argue against this possibility. In particular, we show that
oversized public sectors may actually find the support of the unskilled fraction of the society.
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The reason for this is that unskilled workers indirectly benefit from bureaucratic rent seeking
by seeing their (equilibrium) market wages inflated as a result of public sector overmanning.
There are a number of past articles that have embedded models of endogenous rent-seeking
behaviour into general equilibrium frameworks. Notable examples are Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny (1991) and Acemoglu and Verdier (1998, 2000). Murphy et al. (1991) studied how the
choice between entrepreneurship and rent-seeking activities by the most talented individuals
determines technical change and growth. Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) focused on the effects of
property rights enforcement in a context of entrepreneurial opportunistic behaviour. Acemoglu
and Verdier (2000) dealt with the level of optimal bureaucratic intervention when the central
(benevolent) government is confronted with both market failures and potential bureaucratic
corruption. None of these articles has centred their attention on the interaction between the
size, skill composition and efficiency of the public sector, together with its ensuing effects on
the level of entrepreneurship, which are the main themes of our paper.
A closely related article is Macchiavello (2008), which also studies the possibility of multiple
equilibria in an occupational choice model with public service motivated agents. His paper
looks, however, at a public sector whose size and educational composition is exogenously fixed.
Instead, our model highlights the importance of accounting for skills (or educational) differences,
since the wage distortion becomes a crucial feature in explaining the following two phenomena:
i) why a bloated public sector may adversely affect profits and entrepreneurship; ii) why a
fraction of the society (the working class) may be willing to support rent-seeking bureaucrats
who sustain a large and inefficient state apparatus. The latter point above contributes also to
the political economy literature that has sought to endogenise the emergence and persistence
of inefficient state institutions [e.g., Hassler et al. (2003), and Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni
(2011)], by suggesting an additional channel that could generate political support for institutions
that depress aggregate productivity.5
Our paper also relates to the growing literature on the quality of bureaucrats and politi-
cians, e.g. Besley (2004), Caselli and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), Mattozi and
Merlo (2008), Bond (2008). A key aspect of all this literature is that it studies the process
of self-selection into bureaucratic and political jobs within a partial equilibrium approach: in
particular, it assumes that the returns in the private sector are exogenous and remain unaf-
fected by who end up in the public sector. By contrast, in our model, the interplay between
self-selection into public bureaucracy and the returns to private entrepreneurship lies at the
heart of our theory and its main predictions.
5More recently, an interesting political economy mechanism complementary to our story has been proposed
by Aney et al. (2011) within an occupational choice framework with credit market frictions. Their model leads
to a class structure that distorts institutions by removing incentives to vote for surplus-maximising policies.
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Finally, occupational choice models in the development literature have so far mostly studied
the long-run consequences of financial markets imperfections.6 In particular, Ghatak, Morelli
and Sjo¨stro¨m (2007), Aney et al. (2011) and Jaimovich (2011) have focused on how finan-
cial markets imperfections may interact with the inability of markets to allocate agents to the
occupations for which they are comparatively best suited. Our paper sheds light on how imper-
fections in the sorting of bureaucrats may also result in market distortions which preclude full
development of the entrepreneurial sector, even in the absence of credit market imperfections.
2 Public Sector Overmanning and Rent Seeking
The mechanism we propose in this paper mostly applies to urbanised developing countries,
regions or even cities, where labour markets are not fragmented and state capacity has somewhat
developed. Anecdotal evidence of public sector overmanning in developing regions is indeed
overwhelming [see, for example, Heller and Tait (1983), Gelb, Knight and Sabot (1991), Kikeri
(1998)].7 Interestingly, this phenomenon can also be found in poorer regions of developed
economies with large degrees of cross-regional inequality. For example, Alesina, Danninger and
Rostagno (2001) report huge differences in size and productivity of postal offices across Italian
regions: while in the relatively richer North 179 postal workers are needed to deliver 100,000
units of correspondence, the number rises to 566 in the Centre, and to 1,783 in the relatively
poorer South.8
The link between regional inequality, public employment and development goes beyond
pure anecdotal evidence. Table 1 reports some correlations between public employment and
income per capita. We look at three developed economies (Italy, Spain and US) which exhibit
the largest degree of regional inequality among the 11 industrialised economies reported in
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). We also look at Brazil, a federal developing country with high
regional inequality and around 85% urban population. Table 1 shows that the public sector is
consistently larger in poorer regions for these four economies.9
The above phenomenon can find several explanations; the simplest probably being that the
public sector steps in to provide employment in the absence of a vigorous private sector. Even
6E.g., Banerjee and Newman (1993), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000), Ghatak et
al. (2001).
7As an illustrative example, a New York Times article (April 15, 1987) entitled ‘In Brazil, Battle of the Bloated
Bureaucracy’ recounts various examples of overmanned public offices in different states of Brazil, to the point
that one Governor claimed ’that he could administer the state with only 30 percent of the current employees’.
8The same regional pattern holds for the fraction of postal workers among the total number of workers, and for
similar measures of productivity among police officers, tax inspectors and railway workers (see Table 3, therein).
9For illustrative purposes, Table 1 also shows that this correlation does not hold for Sweden and Denmark,
two developed economies with relatively low inter-regional inequality.
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Table 1: Public Sector Employment and Income per capita - Regional Variation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Regional Income per capita
Italy Spain US Brazil Sweden Denmark
Log Regional Public -1.01 -0.62 -0.50 -0.79 -0.19 0.15
Sector Employment (%) (7.69)*** (4.06)*** (3.04)*** (2.97)*** (1.34) (0.54)
Number of Regions 19 16 48 26 21 10
Year 1996 2004 2007 1991 2007 2007
R-squared 0.67 0.45 0.59 0.27 0.69 0.27
Robust absolute t-statistics in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and ***
significant at 1%. Regressions exclude regions that consist only (or mainly) on the capital city, i.e.
Lazio (Italy), Madrid (Spain), DC (US - Hawaii and Alaska are also excluded), Brasilia (Brazil),
Stockholm (Sweden) and Copenhagen (Denmark).
though this is empirically plausible (and we do not dispute the validity of this argument), we
propose a theory where the lack of opportunities in the private sector arises as an equilibrium
result due to excessive public employment. In addition, the presumption that follows from
the public sector acting as the employer of last resort is that its size would dwindle as new
opportunities in the private sector arise for workers. Our model would instead suggest that the
likelihood of a private sector resurgence is not ensured because its profitability may be kept low
precisely by the presence of a bloated public sector. In that respect, unless there is an important
shock (e.g. a sudden rise in private sector productivity) a region would not (spontaneously)
undo a configuration with a bloated public sector and little private activity.
Another important feature in our theory is the notion that an oversized public sector is
somehow a symptom of underlying bureaucratic opportunistic behaviour. One of the first
studies to propose a theoretical link between rent seeking and the size of the public sector
is Niskanen (1971), which describes bureaucrats as self-interested agents whose objective is
increasing the size of the budgets they manage as much as possible. In our model, such self-
interested attitude by a fraction of the society leads to expanding public employment well
beyond the level required to efficiently produce the public goods demanded by the society. A
similar view is present in Gelb et al. (1991) who maintain that public employment is usually
seen in less developed economies as a rent-extraction device rather than as an input to produce
public goods.10 As mentioned before, a number of different motives, such as featherbedding,
nepotism, or clientelistic practices, may all lead state bureaucrats to expand public employment
10Even in the cases of developed economies, the size of public employment seems to raise suspicion of oppor-
tunistic behaviour. For example, Durden (1990) measures rent-seeking behaviour across US states by the share
of workers employed in federal and state government jobs.
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as a channel to generate and extract rents11.
A distinctive feature in our theory is that dysfunctional public sectors are not strictly de-
fined by their overall size, but actually by the more nuanced understanding of which type of
public employment grows. In particular, our theory suggests that lower public sector quality
is associated with a greater proportion of unskilled workers. Table 2 looks at this correlation,
using the 5-year average share of unskilled workers for a cross-section of countries for the period
2002-2006, and standard measures of public sector quality (from Transparency International
and The World Bank, see details at the bottom of the table). We can observe that he simple
correlation holds (column 1), and that it also remains strong even when controlling for regional
dummies, the share of skilled workers in the economy, the level of GDP per capita and size
of the public sector (columns 2-4). That suggests that alternative mechanisms, that could be
correlated with both phenomena such as the general level of development or the availability of
skills in the economy, are not driving this correlation. Similarly, the result does not reflect the
scale of the public sector.
In the remainder of the paper we introduce an occupational choice model that aims at ratio-
nalising the above correlations. Our model will link together bureaucratic rent-seeking and the
bloating of the public sector with unskilled workers as an equilibrium outcome. Such correlation
turns out to be the counterpart of an economy with low income and scant entrepreneurship,
as the wage distortions caused by the public sector bloatedness ultimately discourages private
activity.
11A good summary of how we approach this phenomenon is provided by Geddes (1994, page 27) with reference
to Latin America:
‘Administrators and politicians under traditional arrangements have the power to decide who will
be hired to fill government posts. These officials have the choice of hiring the people who will
contribute most to the officials’ personal welfare (usually members of their own families); hiring the
people who will contribute most to consolidating political support for themselves or their parties;
or hiring the people who will contribute most to administrative effectiveness (the most technically
qualified applicants). For the administrator or politician involved, choosing the applicant most
likely to contribute to improving the administration often involves a certain and immediate loss of
either personal or political benefits.’
.
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Table 2: Quality and Composition of the Public Sector - Cross Country Evidence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Share Unskilled Workers in the Public Sector
Corruption Perception -0.041 -0.072
Index (2.72)*** (3.46)***
Log Share Public 0.127 0.163 0.178
Sector Employment (2.16)** (3.42)*** (3.61)***
Log Share -0.311 -0.316 -0.308
Skilled Workers (4.56)*** (4.50)*** (4.28)***
Log GDP pc 0.189 0.156 0.115
(2.89)*** (2.85)*** (2.06)**
Government Effectiveness -0.168
(3.15)***
Regulatory Quality -0.141
(2.76)***
Region Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.11 0.57 0.58 0.57
Absolute values of Robust t-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** signifi-
cant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Corruption Perception Index (from Transparency
International), Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality (from the World
Bank) are indices whose value increase the better the perception of government
performance. We define unskilled labour d according to ISCO88 classification and
we includes clerks, service workers, machine operators, etc. (codes 4 to 9). Skilled
correspond to codes 1 to 3 and includes managers, professionals and technicians.
Public sector comprises public administration and defence. Using these definitions,
”Log Share Unskilled Workers in the Public Sector” is the log of unskilled workers in
the public sector over total workers in the public sector. ”Log Share Public Sector
Employment” is the log of employees in the public sector over total workers. ”Log
share skilled workers” is the log of skilled workers over total workers in the economy.
Regions include all continents and a category for industrialised countries. All data
are averaged for the period 2002-2006.
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3 Setup of the Model
3.1 Environment
We consider a single-period economy with two productive sectors: i) the public sector, and ii)
the private sector. The economy is inhabited by a continuum of risk-neutral individuals with
mass equal to 2. A mass 1 of the individuals are unskilled; the remainder unit mass are skilled.
Individuals’ skills are publicly observable. Every individual (regardless of his skill) is endowed
with an initial monetary income x > 0 and with one unit of unskilled labour time, which he
could supply in the labour market.
3.1.1 The Private Sector
Private firms produce a private good using two types of inputs: one unit of entrepreneurial skills
and unskilled labour (in variable amount). Entrepreneurial skills are possessed only by skilled
agents, who are all identically endowed with one unit of these skills.
A firm owned by a skilled agent produces output (the private good) according to the following
production function, where l denotes the amount of labour employed by the entrepreneur:12
y(l) = A lα, where 0 < α ≤ 12 . (1)
Henceforth we normalise the price of the private good to unity. The optimisation problem
of the entrepreneurs then yields the following labour demand and entrepreneurial profits, both
functions of w:
l(w) = (αA/w)
1
1−α and Π(w) = A
1
1−α (1− α)α α1−αw− α1−α (2)
3.1.2 The Public Sector
The public sector is composed by a continuum of public offices with mass b ∈ (0, 1). Each office
is managed by a bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are appointed by the central administration with the
mandate to ensure that one unit of the public good is produced in their offices. Bureaucrats
receive a fixed salary B > 0 provided they fulfil their mandate; otherwise they receive no
payment. Only skilled agents may be appointed bureaucrats. Once an individual accepts a
12Setting the upper-bound at α = 0.5, rather than the usual restriction α ∈ (0, 1), allows an easier (and
speedier) exposition of our main results. However, we should stress here that relatively low values of α are
instrumental for our proposed wage mechanism, so some of our results will not straightforwardly extend to cases
in which α is sufficiently close to 1 (see footnote to Proposition 2 later on). Intuitively, a smaller α implies a
less elastic labour demand function, which in turn means a stronger response by equilibrium wages to a bloating
public sector.
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bureaucratic job, he cannot resign.
Bureaucrats organise the production of public goods in each office; without them public
offices cannot produce any public goods. In addition, bureaucrats decide the number of unskilled
workers to hire for their offices. Throughout the paper, we assume that the entire public sector
is fully financed by lump-sum taxes collected by the central administration and distributed
among the public offices according to their needs. In addition, we assume that x is large enough
to ensure that individual lump-sum taxes are always affordable to all agents in the economy.13
Denote by gi the amount of public good produced in office i. We assume the following
production function in the public sector:
gi(ei, ni) = θi (ei + ni) /2, (3)
where ei = {0, 1} is the level of bureaucratic effort and ni equals the amount of labour hired
by office i. Bureaucratic effort is publicly unobservable. The variable θi is an idiosyncratic
office-productivity shock that can take two possible values, namely: θi = {1, 2}, each one with
probability one-half. The realisation of θi is learned by the bureaucrat only after he has accepted
the job in office i. The bureaucrat i is the only agent who is able to observe the realisation of
θi. After observing the value taken by θi, the bureaucrat announces θ˜i = {1, 2} to the central
administration in order to ask for the needed funds to meet the production target gi (·) = 1.
Bureaucrats may try to lie to the central administration: they may wish to announce θ˜i = 1
when actually θi = 2, so as to receive funds to hire ni = 1 while putting ei = 0. For that reason,
we assume that the central administration will audit offices for which θ˜i = 1. In order not to
be caught misrepresenting θi, a bureaucrat has got to spend some unproductive effort to hide
his misdeeds. In particular, we suppose that if a bureaucrat spends an amount of unproductive
effort εi, he will be able to avoid being caught understating the actual θi with probability 3εi.
Finally, we assume that if auditors find out that θi = 2 after an announcement θ˜i = 1, they
force the bureaucrat to set ei = 1.
3.1.3 Preferences: Public Service Motivation
Skilled agents differ in terms of their level of public service motivation. A fraction µ ∈ (0, 1)
among those individuals are public service motivated agents (henceforth, PSM). The remainder,
1 − µ, are referred to as profit-driven agents (henceforth, PD). We assume agents’ preferences
13All our main results remain in place if we replaced lump-sum taxation by a proportional income tax. With
a proportional income tax, we would not need the additional assumption of x > 0. However, in addition to
increasing the algebraic complexity of the model, income taxes introduce an additional source of distortion on
occupational choices (on top of that of inflated unskilled wages). In that respect, the choice of lump-sum taxation
is essentially driven by the desire to present our proposed mechanism as cleanly as possible
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(i.e., whether an agent is PSM or PD) are private information. In addition, henceforth, we
assume that there exist enough PSM agents in the economy to (possibly) manage all the public
offices; that is, we impose:14
Assumption 1 µ ≥ b.
Bureaucrats derive utility from their income and disutility from the effort they exert at work.
We assume that disutility of bureaucratic effort is decreasing in the degree of public mindedness.
In particular, conditional on having met the production target, the (ex-post) payoff function of
bureaucrat i is given by15
Ui = B − 3
2
(
ei
1 + λi
+ εi
)
(4)
where: λi =
 0 if i is a PD agent,λ > 0 if i is a PSM agent.
In order for the allocation of public mindedness to noticeably influence the operation of the
economy, not only we need a sufficient mass of PSM agents relative to the size of the public
sector (Assumption 1), but also that their intrinsic motivation is sufficiently strong relative to
that of PD agents. The following assumption deals with this issue.
Assumption 2 λ > 2.
A bureaucrat who runs an office where θi = 1 will optimally announce θ˜i = 1; otherwise
he will fail to comply with the production target g(·) = 1 and, consequently, lose his salary B.
However, truth-telling is not guaranteed if a bureaucrat finds out that θi = 2. In this case, the
bureaucrat may wish to announce θ˜i = 1, so as to give himself room to shirk with probability
3εi, by spending εi units of unproductive effort to cover up his misdeeds. The following lemma
states the optimal announcements and εi, by each type of bureaucrat.
Lemma 1
(i) PD bureaucrats always announce θ˜i = 1, setting εi = 1/3 when θi = 2, and εi = 0 when
θi = 1.
(ii) If Assumption 2 holds, PSM bureaucrats always announce θ˜i = θi, setting always εi = 0.
14The only reason why we impose Assumption 1 is to allow the model to possibly yield an equilibrium in
which all public offices are managed by motivated agents. If this condition did not hold, then the model would
always need that some unmotivated agents become bureaucrats, leading thus quite mechanically to equilibria
with rent-seeking behaviour.
15Also, for completeness, payoff functions (2) and (4) should also include two additional terms: (i) a positive
term capturing the utility derived from public goods consumption, (ii) a negative term equal to the lump-sum
taxes paid by each individual. Given that both (i) and (ii) will affect all agents equally, for the time being, there
is no harm to our results by not explicitly including any of these two terms in the payoff functions, as neither (i)
nor (ii) will have any impact on the optimal occupational choices of the individuals.
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Proof. In Appendix.
The result in Lemma 1 is, admittedly, a mechanical implication of the parametric assump-
tions in (4) and Assumption 2. However, the essence of the lemma is somewhat more general:
since PSM agents are more willing to exert bureaucratic effort, they are in general also less
prone to cheat about θi so as to extract rents by overmanning their offices with unnecessary
workers.
From the previous discussion and Lemma 1, it follows that the amount of employment in
each of the public offices will depend both on the productivity shock and on the bureaucrat’s
type. In particular, a PSM bureaucrat will hire public workers according to:
nPSM =
 0 if θi = 2,1 if θi = 1. (5)
On the other hand, PD bureaucrats will hire public workers according to:
nPD = 1, always. (6)
PSM bureaucrats always exert effort ePSM = 1, whereas PD bureaucrats put ePD = 1 only
if θi = 1, setting instead ePD = 0 when θi = 2. By using these results and Lemma 1, we can
write down the level of (expected) utility achieved by each type of bureaucrat:
UPSM = B − γ, (7)
where γ ≡ 3/ [2 (1 + λ)], and
UPD = B − 1. (8)
Notice that Assumption 2 implies γ < 1, hence UPSM > UPD.
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3.2 Timing of the Events
The events in the model occur in six different stages, according to the following sequence:
1. Bureaucrats salary decision: The central administration fixes B once-and-for-all.
2. First-stage occupational choice of skilled agents: Each skilled agent decides whether
or not to apply for a bureaucratic job. Applying for a bureaucratic post is costless.
16Notice that the parameter λ in (4) could encompass as well an alternative interpretation in terms of relative
skills for managerial activities in the public sector. From this perspective, agents with large λ would exhibit a
comparative advantage as bureaucrats. Assuming that the value of λ is publicly unobservable, the issue in this
case would be whether the economy is able to fill the state bureaucracy only with agents with high λ.
12
3. Allocation of bureaucratic posts: If the total mass of applicants to bureaucratic jobs
is no larger than b, all the applicants obtain the job. Otherwise, the mass b of bureaucratic
posts is assigned by a draw among all the applicants.
4. Second-stage occupational choice of skilled agents: Each skilled agent who did not
apply (in stage 2) or did not get (in stage 3) a bureaucratic job decides whether or not to
start a private entrepreneurial project.
5. Announcements, assignment of public funds, and labour market transactions:
Each bureaucrat i observes θi ∈ {1, 2} and announces θ˜i ∈ {1, 2}. The central adminis-
tration audits offices announcing θ˜i = 1 and, subsequently, distributes the required funds
to each office. Bureaucrats and entrepreneurs hire workers in the labour market. All
remaining agents supply their unit-time labour endowment in the market.
6. Production stage: Production takes place and all payments are made.
4 Market Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we study the joint determination of the individuals’ optimal occupational choices
and the unskilled workers market-clearing wage, for a given bureaucratic salary B.
4.1 Optimal Occupational Choice
Before proceeding to study the general equilibrium results of the model, it proves instructive
to first characterise the optimal occupational choice of the individuals, given the wage w (and
the bureaucrats salary B). From now on, and without any loss of generality, we assume that
whenever agents are indifferent between a bureaucratic job and any other occupation, they
always choose the former.
In order to facilitate the exposition, for the remainder of Section 4, we will often letB > A˜+1,
where A˜ ≡ αα (1− α)1−αA. This condition implies that there exists a wage threshold, ŵ, where
0 < ŵ < A˜, such that: if w < ŵ, PD agents choose not to apply for a bureaucratic post since
they are better off as private entrepreneurs; whereas, if w ≥ ŵ, these agents actually prefer a
bureaucratic job to running a firm. In other words, ŵ is the wage level at which Π(ŵ) ≡ B− 1.
It is easy to observe that:
ŵ ≡ αA 1α
(
1− α
B − 1
) 1−α
α
. (9)
(Notice that if B < A˜ + 1, PD agents would never choose bureaucracy as an occupation,
switching from entrepreneurial activities to supplying unskilled labour when the market wage
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rises above A˜.)
We can also define the threshold w, such that when w < w entrepreneurial profits are also
greater than B − γ, implying that not even PSM agents wish to apply to bureaucratic jobs.
Namely:
w ≡ αA 1α
(
1− α
B − γ
) 1−α
α
. (10)
Figure 1 plots the payoff functions of bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and workers, for a varying
w, given Assumption 2 and B > A˜ + 1. These payoff functions correspond to those elicited
before in (2) for the entrepreneurs, (7) for PSM bureaucrats, and (8) for PD bureaucrats; the
w-line portrays the payoff of any agent in the economy who becomes a worker.
• For all 0 ≤ w < w : No agent applies for a bureaucratic post. All skilled agents in the
economy become entrepreneurs.
• For all w ≤ w < ŵ : Only PSM agents apply for a bureaucratic post. All the skilled agents
that did not apply or get a bureaucratic job become entrepreneurs.
• For all ŵ ≤ w ≤ A˜ : Both PSM and PD agents apply for a bureaucratic post. If ŵ ≤
w < A˜, all the skilled agents that did not get a bureaucratic job become entrepreneurs; if
w = A˜, they choose indifferently between becoming either entrepreneurs or workers.
• For all A˜ < w ≤ B − 1 : Both PSM and PD agents apply for a bureaucratic post. All the
skilled agents that did not get a bureaucratic job become workers.
• For all B − 1 < w ≤ B − γ : Only PSM agents apply for a bureaucratic post. All the
skilled agents that did not apply or get a bureaucratic job become workers.
• For all w > B−γ : No agent applies for a bureaucratic post. Everyone becomes a worker.
The main result that we wish to stress here is the existence of a wage threshold, ŵ, at
which PD agents change their minds regarding their most desired occupation. Below ŵ, PD
agents optimally self-select away from the public sector, since they are better off making profits
in the private sector, which are relatively high due to low labour cost. However, for ŵ ≤ w,
profits are not high enough to attract PD agents, who turn out to be better off as (rent-seeking)
bureaucrats.
4.2 General Equilibrium Analysis
Two additional conditions must be satisfied in the general equilibrium analysis: first, the labour
market must clear; second, no bureaucratic post must remain unfilled. More formally:
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Figure 1: Payoff functions by different occupations
Definition 1 (Market General Equilibrium) A market general equilibrium is characterised
by: i) a market wage, w, ii) a bureaucrats salary, B, and iii) an occupational choice by each
agent in the economy; such that the following three conditions are simultaneously satisfied:
1. All individuals choose their occupations optimally.
2. The labour market clears.
3. All bureaucratic posts are filled.
Condition 1 has been illustrated in the previous subsection. Condition 2 stipulates the
labour market clearing condition. Condition 3 simply requires that, in equilibrium, there must
be enough applicants to fill all bureaucratic positions in the public sector. Regarding this last
condition, one additional remark applies: it will somehow restrict the range of values that B
may possibly take. In that respect, notice that Condition 3 implies neither 0 ≤ w < w =
αA
1
α [(1− α) / (B − γ)] 1−αα nor w > B− γ may hold in equilibrium, as they would both lead to
a situation in which no one applies to bureaucratic jobs. For this reason, we will carry on with
the rest of our analysis letting w ≤ w ≤ B − γ.
Our main focus here is on the interplay between the optimal occupational choice of the
skilled and the equilibrium wage in the labour market. Bearing in mind the results in Section
4.1, and using the equations (5) and (6), we can write down the analytical expressions for the
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(aggregate) labour demand and labour supply functions, respectively:
LD(w) =

(1− b) (αA/w) 11−α + b/2 if w ≤ w < ŵ,
(1− b) (αA/w) 11−α + b (1− µ/2) if ŵ ≤ w < A˜,[
b (1− µ/2) , (1− b) α1−α + b (1− µ/2)
]
if w = A˜,
b (1− µ/2) if A˜ < w ≤ B − 1
b/2 if B − 1 < w ≤ B − λ
(11)
LS(w) =

1 if w < A˜,
[1, 2− b] if w = A˜,
2− b if A˜ < w ≤ B − λ,
(12)
From (11), we can observe that the labour demand function is non-monotonic in w. In
particular, LD(w) jumps at w = ŵ by the strictly positive amount b (1− µ) /2. This happens
because, at w = ŵ, PD agents’ most desired occupation switches from entrepreneurship to state
bureaucracy. Whenever w < ŵ all the public offices end up managed by PSM bureaucrats, who
properly fulfill their tasks and keep their offices lean, without any unnecessary workers. Instead,
just above w = ŵ, a fraction (1 − µ) of bureaucratic jobs end up in the hands of PD agents,
who (whenever they are able to) abuse their positions to extract rents by hiring more workers
per office than really needed.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then:
(i) An equilibrium in which only PSM agents become bureaucrats exists if and only if:
B̂ ≡ A (1− α)
(
1− b/2
1− b
)α
+ γ ≤ B < A (1− α)
(
1− b/2
1− b
)α
+ 1 ≡ B. (13)
(ii) An equilibrium in which a fraction µ of the bureaucratic jobs go to PSM agents, while the
remaining fraction (1− µ) go to PD agents exists if and only if:
B ≥ A (1− α)
[
1− b (1− µ/2)
1− b
]α
+ 1 ≡ B(µ). (14)
Proof. In Appendix.
Proposition 1 (i) shows that a necessary condition for keeping PD agents away from the
state bureaucracy is that the bureaucrats salary is not too large (B < B). However, as shown in
part (ii), B < B is actually not sufficient to ensure such a goal is achieved. In particular, when
B ≥ B(µ), an equilibrium (possibly not unique) exists in which all skilled agents in the economy
apply for a bureaucratic job. Notice that B′(µ) > 0, implying that an economy with a larger
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fraction of PSM agents exhibits a smaller range of values of B for which such an equilibrium
exists.
From (13) and (14), we can immediately observe that B(µ) < B. However, nothing guar-
antees that B(µ) > B̂. In fact, none of our parametric restrictions imposed so far ensures that
a unique equilibrium where only PSM agents apply for bureaucratic jobs actually exists. For
B(µ) to be greater than B̂ (so that there exists a feasible range where B is low enough that
it only attracts PSM agents to the state bureaucracy while it is also consistent with a general
equilibrium) preferences of PSM and PD agents must be sufficiently different. It turns out that,
for values of A which are not too large, there always exists a value of λ large enough (implying
a value of γ sufficiently close to zero) such that B(µ) > B̂ holds:
Lemma 2 If 1− γ > A (1− α) Γ, then B(µ) > B̂, where
Γ ≡ (1− b/2)
α − (1− b+ bµ/2)α
(1− b)α (15)
features a positively valued function with an upper-bound Γ(α) < 1. Moreover, Γ(α) decreases
as α gets smaller, and in the limit equals zero, that is: Γ
′
(α) > 0 and limα−→0 Γ(α) = 0.
Proof. In Appendix.
Notice that since Γ in (15) is bounded above at Γ(α) < 1, then when A is not too large so
that A (1− α) Γ(α) < 1, there will always exist a λ large enough leading to B(µ) > B̂. The
following corollary combines the previous results in Proposition 1 and Lemma 2, and describes
the different types of equilibria that may arise in the model. Figure 2 illustrates each of the
three cases when the parametric condition 1− γ > A (1− α) Γ actually holds.
Corollary 1 If 1− γ > A (1− α) Γ, three different equilibrium cases are possible depending on
B:
(i) Lean public sector unique equilibrium: If B̂ ≤ B < B(µ), the equilibrium is unique. In
the equilibrium, only PSM agents apply for (and obtain) bureaucratic jobs, the mass of unskilled
public employees equals b/2, and the wage of unskilled workers is
w∗ = αA
(
1− b
1− b/2
)1−α
. (16)
(ii) Bloated public sector unique equilibrium: If B ≥ B, the equilibrium is unique. In the
equilibrium, both PSM and PD agents apply for bureaucratic jobs, a fraction µ of these jobs go
to PSM agents, a fraction 1− µ go to PD agents, the mass of unskilled public employees equals
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Figure 2: Labour Market Equilibria - three different cases
b (1− µ/2), and the wage of unskilled workers is
w∗∗ = αA
(
1− b
1− b(1− µ/2)
)1−α
. (17)
(iii) Multiple equilibria: If B(µ) ≤ B < B, there exist two equilibria in the model. One of
the equilibria features a ‘lean public sector equilibrium’, with identical characteristics as that of
case (i) above. The other equilibrium features a ‘bloated public sector equilibrium’, with identical
characteristics as that of case (ii) above.
If 1− γ < A (1− α) Γ, then B(µ) ≤ B̂, and only cases (ii) and (iii) above are feasible.
Henceforth, for brevity, we will often refer to each of the two types of equilibria described
above, respectively, as lean equilibrium and bloated equilibrium.17
The lean equilibrium is characterised by an efficient allocation of agents to activities, in the
sense that all bureaucratic jobs end up in the hands of the agents who display a comparative
advantage for these jobs: the PSM agents. PSM bureaucrats manage their offices ethically. More
precisely, the do not abuse their power in order to bloat their offices with excessive workers as
a mean to extract rents. This disciplines wages in the labour market, which in turn means that
entrepreneurial profits remain attractive enough to keep PD agents away from rent seeking in
the public sector.
However, the economy may well fail to coordinate the allocation of agents correctly, ending
up in a bloated equilibrium, as those where the market wage is w∗∗ ≥ ŵ. In such cases, it
17Notice that α < 0.5 ensures that both w∗ and w∗∗ are always strictly smaller than A˜. We should stress here
that w∗ < A˜ is crucial for our results, as otherwise a bloated the public sector would fail to push the equilibrium
wage above w∗. For values of α larger than (2− b) / (4− 3b) the model would actually deliver w∗ = A˜, removing
the possibility of bloated equilibrium to exist. However, this upper-bound on α could easily be relaxed by letting
the mass of unskilled agents rise above one.
18
becomes optimal for all skilled agents (both PSM and PD) to try to get a bureaucratic job in
the public sector. As a result, in a bloated equilibrium, a fraction 1 − µ of the public offices
end up managed by PD bureaucrats who abuse their discretionary power, and extract rents by
hiring an excessive number of public workers. This (mis-)allocation of agents is self-sustaining
since a bloated public sector inflates aggregate labour demand, pushing up the equilibrium
wage, which in turn lowers profits and discourages the PD agents from exercising their skills in
the private sector.
Finally, notice that when 1−γ < A (1− α) Γ, the lean equilibrium does not exist as a unique
equilibrium. This implies that in such cases the efficient allocation of skills in the public sector
cannot be ensured even if bureaucrats salaries were set sufficiently low, which would be the way
to screen skilled agents with heterogeneous levels of public service motivation.18
5 Total Output and Welfare Analysis
In this section we compare, first, the level of aggregate output and, second, individuals’ welfare,
across the different types of equilibria that may arise in the model.
5.1 Aggregate Output
Let us first look at the case where multiple equilibria are feasible. Aggregate output in the lean
equilibrium (Y ∗) is strictly larger than in the bloated equilibrium (Y ∗∗). In equilibrium, total
output is given by
Y =
∫ b
0
gi di+
∫ 1
b
y(l(w)) di = b+ (1− b)A 11−α (α/w) α1−α , (18)
where to obtain (18) we are using the expressions in (1) and (2). From (18), it immediately
follows that the output gap, Y ∗ − Y ∗∗, is strictly positive due to w∗ < w∗∗. Also, it can be
readily observed that the output gap is solely explained by lower private output in the bloated
equilibrium, as aggregate public output equals, by construction, b in both equilibria. Yet, the
underlying cause why Y ∗ > Y ∗∗ actually rests on the public sector behaviour. Intuitively, PD
bureaucrats tend to expand public employment (relative to PSM bureaucrats), which reduces
the labour supply left available for other activities in the economy and thus (partly) crowds out
18Our model focuses on the effect of B on the self-selection into bureaucracy, and rules out (by construction)
any effect B might have on incentives once an agent accepts a bureaucratic job. Notwithstanding, even if a higher
B carries some efficiency-wage component, as long as PSM agents are intrinsically more attracted to bureaucratic
jobs than PD agents are, our self-selection mechanism should remain at play. Furthermore, empirical evidence
on the incentive-effect suggests this effect may in fact be quite weak: see for example Rauch and Evans (2000)
and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001).
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the private sector. However, PD bureaucrats expand the size of the public sector workforce as
a mean to extract rents from it; hence, although public employment is higher, public output
remains constant, implying that aggregate output is smaller in an equilibrium with a fraction
(1− µ) of PD bureaucrats than in one where all bureaucrats are PSM.
The previous paragraph compares aggregate output in situations where multiple equilibria
are feasible for a specific economy. We show below that the result can be extended to any
equilibrium that may arise.
Corollary 2 Take an economy with a given set of parameters: A,µ, α, λ and b, and which
satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. Depending on the specific level of B, two broad types of equilibria
may arise in the economy: (i) equilibria in which only PSM agents apply for bureaucratic jobs;
(ii) equilibria where both PSM and PD agents apply for bureaucratic jobs.
In (i), aggregate output is given by: Y ∗ = b+A (1− b)1−α (1− b/2)α .
In (ii), aggregate output is given by: Y ∗∗ = b+A (1− b)1−α [1− b(1− µ/2)]α .
Corollary 2 then states that, given a specific parametric configuration of the economy, ag-
gregate output is always larger in an equilibrium without rent-seeking bureaucrats (where it
equals Y ∗) than in one where a certain fraction of the bureaucrats take opportunity of the
public sector to extract rents (where it equals Y ∗∗).19
5.2 Welfare Analysis
Let us focus again first on the case in which multiple equilibria are feasible – i.e., Figure 2 (iii).
Although under multiple equilibria output is higher in the lean equilibrium, it turns out that
this equilibrium does not Pareto dominate the bloated one. As a consequence, an aggregate
welfare assessment would require postulating some specific social welfare function. However,
with the model as it stands, welfare comparisons within groups of individuals are still feasible,
and moreover they yield some further interesting insights.
Before proceeding to such analysis, one issue that we need to take properly into account now
is the fact that the total amount of (lump-sum) taxes levied on individuals will differ across the
two equilibria. Let T ∗ and T ∗∗ denote the tax on each individual in the lean and in the bloated
19Notice that although wages in a bloated equilibrium are larger than in a lean equilibrium (w∗∗ > w∗),
equilibrium wages are still a function of several other parameters in the economy; in particular, they are increasing
in the technological parameter A. For this reason, our model should not be read as saying that wages in a poorer
region with a bloated public sector will be larger than in a richer region with a lean public sector, as the technology
(and other factors) may vary as well between those two regions. Quite differently, our model only implies that to
avoid the inefficiencies brought about by the bloated equilibrium, the market wage in the poorer region should
be lower than it actually is.
20
equilibrium, respectively. It is straightforward to notice that T ∗ < T ∗∗.20
PSM agents. In the lean equilibrium, a fraction b/µ become bureaucrats and get utility equal
to UPSM − T ∗; the remaining fraction (1 − b/µ) start a private firm and their payoff equals
Π(w∗) − T ∗, where Π(w∗) < UPSM . In the bloated equilibrium, only a fraction b manage to
obtain a bureaucratic job, which yields UPSM − T ∗∗ as a payoff; the remainder fraction (1− b)
receive a payoff equal to Π(w∗∗)− T ∗∗, where Π(w∗∗) < Π(w∗) due to w∗∗ > w∗. Therefore, all
PSM agents are (in expectation) better off in a lean public sector equilibrium.
PD agents. In the lean equilibrium, all PD agents become entrepreneurs and receive a payoff
equal to Π(w∗)−T ∗. In the bloated equilibrium, a fraction b of them obtain a bureaucratic job,
which yields utility UPD − T ∗∗ < Π(w∗) − T ∗; the remainder fraction (1 − b) receive a payoff
equal to Π(w∗∗)− T ∗∗. Therefore, all PD agents are better off in a lean equilibrium.
Unskilled agents. In this case the welfare comparison is less straightforward than before.
On the one hand, the excessive labour demand resulting from PD bureaucrats rent-seeking
behaviour drives up the wage, which is beneficial to the those agents whose only choice is to
supply their labour endowment.21 On the other hand, like anybody else in the economy, they
must pay higher taxes. Proposition 2 shows that, given our parametric restrictions, for any
bureaucratic salary B ∈ (B(µ), B) the former effect dominates the latter, hence: w∗∗ − T ∗∗ >
w∗ − T ∗.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and B (µ) < B < B, implying that there
exist two equilibria in the economy: one in which the wage equals w∗ (the lean equilibrium),
and one in which it equals w∗∗ (the bloated equilibrium). Let T denote the amount of (lump-
sum) taxes that each individual must pay in order to finance public sector expenditures. Then,
w∗∗ − T ∗∗ > w∗ − T ∗ holds for any b ∈ (0, 1) and any α ∈ (0, 12) .22
Proof. In Appendix.
The fact that the unskilled receive higher wages when there are rent-seeking bureaucrats is
actually a general result, as can be readily observed from Corollary 1. The welfare comparison
across the different cases described in Corollary 1 is, though, more complex than that between
20This is the case because of two (related) reasons. In the bloated equilibrium: (i) the number of unskilled
workers in the public sector is larger, and (ii) their wages are higher.
21This is clearly a very specific type of rent-seeking behaviour that the unskilled may welcome. It may still be
the case that the unskilled would oppose other forms of rent-seeking actions, like extortion or bribery.
22We should stress here that the result w∗∗−T ∗∗ > w∗−T ∗ will not hold for values of α sufficiently close to 1.
The intuition for this lies in the link between α and the wage elasticity of (2): the larger the elasticity of labour
demand by private entrepreneurs, the weaker the upwards pressure on wages caused by a bloating public sector
(because a smaller increase in the wage is needed to restore the equilibrium in the labour market).
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the two possible equilibria within the multiple equilibria case presented in Proposition 2. The
reason being that comparing different cases involves comparing welfare in situations where the
bureaucrats salary B also differs, which in turn affects the total amount of taxes in the economy
too. Nevertheless, the fact that larger B tend to give room to equilibria with rent-seeking
bureaucrats and, consequently, higher wages means that the unskilled might be sympathetic to
paying higher salaries to the bureaucrats, even if that involves higher taxes. We now proceed
to study this particular trade-off.
Given that Proposition 2 deals with the cases in which B (µ) < B < B, we focus our
attention now on the cases in which the equilibrium is unique. The following proposition
stipulates conditions under which, even if a unique lean equilibrium exists in the economy (that
is, even when conditions in Lemma 2 hold and, thus, B (µ) > B̂), the unskilled may turn out
to be better off in a unique bloated equilibrium with B = B.
Proposition 3 There exist thresholds b ≥ 2−√2 ' 0.586 and α > 0, such that when 0 < b < b
and 0 < α < α, there are feasible parametric configurations for which: B (µ) > B̂, hence a
unique lean equilibrium exists when B̂ ≤ B < B (µ) and, nonetheless, the utility obtained by
the unskilled workers in a lean equilibrium with B̂ ≤ B < B (µ) is smaller than the utility they
obtain in the unique bloated equilibrium that arises when B = B.
Proof. In Appendix.
The unskilled may prefer a bloated public sector paying high bureaucratic salaries to a lean
public sector with lower B when b is not too large and α is sufficiently small. Regarding b,
notice that the cost per taxpayer of all bureaucratic salaries equals bB/2, thus a sufficiently
large b turns the cost of inducing PD agents to apply to bureaucracy too high for the unskilled
to be willing to bear it. Concerning α, the intuition is analogous to that in Proposition 2: the
smaller α, the stronger upwards pressure on unskilled wages by a bloating public sector.
Both Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 deal with the unskilled workers welfare comparison
across lean and bloated equilibria. In the former, we compare their utility for a given B within
the range in which multiple equilibria are feasible. In the latter, we do so for different levels
of B consistent with a unique equilibrium (either bloated or lean). Pinning down which of all
possible cases is the most preferred one from the unskilled viewpoint would require modelling
how expectations about aggregate behaviours are formed. This goes beyond the scope of the
paper. Yet, it is straightforwad to note that, if for some B(µ) ≤ B < B the probability
assigned by the unskilled that PD agents will coordinate their actions on a bloated equilibrium
is sufficiently high, then the unskilled workers expected utility will turn out be highest at such
intermediate level of B.
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In summary, this section shows that the unskilled workers may be willing to support rent-
seeking bureaucrats, since the former indirectly benefit from the actions perpetrated by the
latter in the form of inflated market wages. In that regard, our model may then shed light on
the underlying reasons that have made oversized and inefficiently run public sectors so successful
in some countries23.
6 Concluding remarks
We have proposed a model in which the quality of the state bureaucracy crucially affects the
level of aggregate output and private entrepreneurship. The key mechanism at work rests on
the idea that rent-seeking behaviours lead to an oversized public sector, bloated with unskilled
workers. When the public sector expands its demand of unskilled workers in order to create and
extract rents, not only it wastes scarce budgetary resources, but it also stifles entrepreneurial
incentives. In particular, an oversized public sector pushes up the wage of unskilled workers
above the level that would prevail under an efficiently-run public sector, which in turn squeezes
profits and deters potential entrepreneurs from allocating their skills in the private sector.
An alternative argument to ours is that poorer regions exhibit higher public employment
shares as the result of income transfers from richer regions, or simply because there is too
little private activity in the first place and the public sector steps in as an employer of last
resort. We do not intend to downplay any of these two arguments, which are certainly very
relevant from an empirical viewpoint. In fact, we see our theory as complementary (rather than
a competing one), shedding new insights concerning the interaction between the public and
entrepreneurial sectors. In that regard, some of the correlations presented in Section 2 would
not straightforwardly follow from a simple model of cross-regional transfers. More precisely, it
does not seem obvious that the level of perceived public sector quality should correlate negatively
with the fraction of unskilled workers in the public sector, as revealed by Table 2; especially
after controlling for level of income and stock of skills in the economy.
Similarly, we have worked with a frictionless labor market that assumes away unemploy-
ment. Generally, (short-term) unemployment should be the result of some sort of frictions or
stickiness in the labour market preventing an immediate adjustment of the wage to restore the
market-clearing equilibrium. Note, however, that the effect of a public sector absorbing the
(temporary) excess supply of labour may still bring about some similar implications as those in
our benchmark model, by preventing the eventual downward adjustment of wages.
23For example, Geddes (1994) suggests that oversized and inefficiently run public sectors have been common-
place in the past populist governments in Latin America and have relied on widespread support coming from the
working class population as a whole.
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Our model also shows that a bloated public sector, although hurting aggregate output, may
actually enjoy the support of unskilled workers who indirectly benefit from it in the form of
higher wages. In that regard, the model may shed new light on one of the underlying reasons
that have made several populist governments so successful in the past, despite being widely
perceived as running inefficiently large and ineffective public sectors (see Geddes, 1994).
The above political economy argument is closely linked to the choice of taxes and transfers
in the economy. In our model individuals are taxed on a lump-sum basis. This is an issue that
deserves some further discussion: under such circumstances a Pareto-dominating institutional
arrangement may exist relative to the bloated public sector equilibrium. In particular, one could
set bureaucratic salaries low enough to induce only PSM agents become bureaucrats and, at
the same time, make transfers to the unskilled workers to keep their total income equal to that
prevailing in the bloated equilibrium. In principle, this would be feasible to a central planner,
however, institutional constraints or lack of sufficient trust in political bodies may well turn
such a scheme impossible to implement in reality.
Note, too, that the way we model taxation simplifies the exposition, but also (and more im-
portantly) allows us to isolate the wage-distortion effect from other types of distortions working
through taxation. Introducing more realistic taxes into the model (e.g, income taxes) would in
general mean that a bloating public sector would place an additional distortion, on top of that
of inflated wages, on entrepreneurial incentives. In that respect, our previous results would be
somehow reinforced in the presence of taxes that are increasing in earnings. Nonetheless, our
results may be still interpreted as somewhat more general than that. The public sector may well
be financing itself, at least temporarily, by sources other than current taxation: for example,
they may use borrowing. In that case, entrepreneurs should not see their (current) profits being
affected by a bloating a public sector through excessive taxation; however, they would still have
to face higher market wages as the public sector absorbs labour supply.24
One important policy lesson is that the economy has got a lot to gain from improving the
sorting mechanisms into different occupations, in particular when it relates to state bureaucracy.
Contrary to a standard view in the public debate, improving sorting may sometimes require
paying bureaucrats less (and not more), so as to resort to the sense of mission of certain agents
while keeping self-interested agents away. In any case, by promoting policies attracting the right
people or reducing the scope for opportunistic behaviour, the economy may avoid falling into a
rent-seeking trap.
24Notice that even if entrepreneurs were not myopic, and take into account the future rise in taxation to
pay for current public debt (Ricardian Equivalence), this would not be enough by itself to affect their current
occupational choices – we need, in addition to that, a switching cost for occupations over the life cycle (or an
important sunk cost for entrepreneurial activities), so that their current occupational choice is affected by future
taxation as well.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose a bureaucrat intends to announce θ˜i = 1 when θi = 2, so as
to be able to set ei = 0 with probability 3εi. Then, the optimal level of εi is pinned down by
solving:
ε∗i ≡ arg max
0≤εi≤1/3
: E (Ui) = B − 1
2
× 3
2
1
1 + λi
− 1
2
× 3
2
[
(1− 3εi) 1
1 + λi
+ εi
]
. (19)
Since (19) is linear in εi, the optimal level of εi can be found simply by checking the sign of
∂E (Ui) /∂εi: if ∂E (Ui) /∂εi > 0 then ε
∗
i = 1/3, while if ∂E (Ui) /∂εi < 0 then ε
∗
i = 0. Noting
that
sign {∂E (Ui) /∂εi} = sign
{
3 (1 + λi)
−1 − 1
}
,
then ∂E (UPD) /∂εi > 0 obtains, while Assumption 2 ensures ∂E (UPD) /∂εi < 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Suppose first that B̂ > A˜ + 1. An equilibrium in which only
PSM agents apply for bureaucracy exists only if LD(w) crosses LS(w) at a wage strictly below
ŵ and (weakly) above w. This requires (1− b) (αA/ŵ) 11−α +b/2 < 1 ≤ (1− b) (αA/w) 11−α +b/2,
which using (9) and (10) leads to (13). Finally, we still need to prove that PSM agents prefer
bureaucracy to supplying unskilled labour and entrepreneurial profits are larger than wages.
Denoting by w∗ the wage that solves (1− b) (αA/w∗) 11−α + b/2 = 1, we can observe that
B̂ − γ > w∗ = αA [(1− b) / (1− b/2)]1−α, hence UPSM > w∗ for any B̂ ≤ B < B; moreover,
since w∗ < A˜, it follows that w∗ < Π(w∗). Suppose now that B̂ ≤ A˜ + 1. Noting that B is
always strictly larger than A˜+ 1 (since, given our parametric restrictions, α < 1−α), it follows
that the condition (13) also holds when B̂ ≤ A˜+ 1.
(ii) First, notice from (11) and (12) that LD(A˜) < LS(A˜), hence in equilibrium w < A˜.
As a result, an equilibrium in which both PSM and PD agents apply for bureaucracy exists if
LD(ŵ) ≥ 1, which using the second line in (11) and (9) leads to (14). Finally, denoting by w∗∗
the wage that solves (1− b) (αA/w∗∗) 11−α + b (1− µ/2) = 1, we can observe B(µ)− 1 > w∗∗ =
αA [(1− b) / (b− bµ/2)]1−α, hence UPD > w∗∗ for any B ≥ B(µ); moreover, since w∗∗ < A˜,
then w∗∗ < Π(w∗∗).
Proof of Lemma 2. Notice first that ∂Γ/∂µ < 0. Hence, Γ(·) reaches a maximum when
µ = b. Replacing µ = b into (15):
Γ(α, b, µ = b) =
(
1− b2
)α − (1− b+ b22 )α
(1− b)α . (20)
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Notice now that, since 0 < b < 1, the RHS of (20) is strictly increasing in α. Moreover, it is
straightforward to observe that the RHS of (20) approaches zero as α → 0. Given that (20) is
strictly increasing in α, it then suffices to focus α = 12 . Plugging this value into (20), it follows
that we need to prove that
(
1− b2
) 1
2 < (1− b) 12 +
(
1− b+ b22
) 1
2
, ∀ b ∈ (0, 1) . (21)
A sufficient condition for (21) to hold is that: 1− b2 < 2− 2b+ b
2
2 ; which is necessarily true for
any b ∈ (0, 1), since the function ψ(b) = 32b− b
2
2 is strictly increasing within the interval [0, 1],
with ψ(1) = 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using the results in Corollary 1, it follows that w∗∗−T ∗∗ > w∗−T ∗
if and only if:
w∗∗ − 12b [B + (1− µ/2)w∗∗] > w∗ − 12b
(
B + 12w
∗) . (22)
Plugging (16) and (17) into (22) leads to, w∗∗ − T ∗∗ > w∗ − T ∗, if and only if:
2− b (1− µ/2)
2− b/2 >
[
1− b (1− µ/2)
1− b/2
]1−α
≡ Φ(α). (23)
Notice that Φ′(α) > 0, since the expression within squared brackets is strictly smaller than 1.
This, in turn, implies that we only need to prove that (23) holds for α = 0.5. Setting α = 0.5 into
(23), leads to the following condition [2− b (1− µ/2)]2 (1− b/2) > (2− b/2)2 [1− b (1− µ/2)] ,which
after some simple, but tedious, algebra yields:
(
1− µ
2
)2(
1− b
2
)
>
1
4
[
1− b
(
1− µ
2
)]
. (24)
Notice that (24) is always necessarily true, since (1− µ/2)2 > 1/4 for any 0 < µ < 1, and
b/2 < b (1− µ/2) because 0 < µ < 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. First of all, note that any B̂ ≤ B < B(µ) leads to a unique
equilibrium with wage w∗. As consequence, since a larger B involves higher taxes, to prove the
proposition it suffices to show that the utility of unskilled workers in the bloated equilibrium
with B = B may be greater than their utility in the lean equilibrium with B = B̂. This occurs
when the following condition holds:
w∗∗ [2− b(1− µ/2)]− w∗ (2− b/2) > b(B − B̂); (25)
Using (25) we can observe that, when a unique lean equilibrium exists, the unskilled prefer
26
the bloated equilibrium with B rather than the lean equilibrium with B̂ when
α (1− b)1−α
[
2− b(1− µ/2)
[1− b (1− µ/2)]1−α −
2− b/2
(1− b/2)1−α
]
>
b(1− γ)
A
. (26)
In addition, a unique lean equilibrium exists –i.e. B̂ < B(µ)– if and only if (1−γ) > Γ (1− α)A.
Hence, using the expression for Γ in (15), it follows that configurations that lead a situation
where the unskilled to prefer B over B̂ must necessarily satisfy the following condition
α
1− α
1− b
b
[
2− b(1− µ/2)
[1− b (1− µ/2)]1−α −
2− b/2
(1− b/2)1−α
]
> (1− b/2)α − [1− b(1− µ/2)]α ,
which after some algebra leads to the condition:
S(α) ≡ (1− b/2)1−α
[
α
1−α
1−b
b (2− b+ bµ/2) + (1− b+ bµ/2)
]
− (1− b+ bµ/2)1−α
[
α
1−α
1−b
b (2− b/2) + (1− b/2)
]
> 0.
(27)
Letting α = 0 in (27), we can observe S(0) = 0. Next, differentiate S(α), to obtain:
S′(α) =
(
1− b2
)1−α 1−b
b(1−α)2
(
2− b+ bµ2
)
− ln (1− b2) (1− b2)1−α [ α1−α 1−bb (2− b+ bµ2 )+ (1− b+ bµ2 )]
−
(
1− b+ bµ2
)1−α
1−b
b(1−α)2
(
2− b2
)
+ ln
(
1− b+ bµ2
)(
1− b+ bµ2
)1−α [
α
1−α
1−b
b
(
2− b2
)
+
(
1− b2
)]
.
Let again α = 0, which simplifies the above expression to:
S′(0) =
(1− b) (1− µ)
2
− (1− b+ bµ/2) (1− b/2) ln
[
(1− b/2)
(1− b+ bµ/2)
]
.
Now, denote 1+H ≡ (1− b/2) / (1− b+ bµ/2), which means thatH ≡ [(1− µ) b/2] / (1− b+ bµ/2).
In addition, by property of the natural logarithm, we have that ln(1 +H) ≤ H; hence
S′(0) ≥ 0.5 (1− b) (1− µ)− (1− b+ bµ/2) (1− b/2)H = 0.5 (1− µ) (1− 2b+ b2/2) . (28)
Notice now that
(
1− 2b+ b2/2) ≥ 0 for any b ≤ 2 − √2 ' 0.586. As a result, there exists
b ≥ 2 − √2, such that when 0 < b < b, S′(0) > 0 and thus, when 0 < α < α with α > 0,
we may find feasible parametric configurations such that the expression on the LHS of (26) is
strictly larger than bΓ (1− α). Lastly, bearing in mind that the difference between (1− γ) and
Γ (1− α)A can be made arbitrarily small by appropriately adjusting the values of γ and A, it
follows that we may also find parametric configurations such that (26) holds, which completes
the proof the proposition.
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